"Means as Ends"

Syllabus | Introduction | Unit I | Unit II | Unit III

UNIT 1: CLASSIFICATIONS OF REGIMES AND THE ENDS OF
THE MODERN REGIME

Classifying Regimes: Inequality and Equality

A proper study of the various institutions, processes, and procedures characteristic of liberal democracies requires some familiarity with both liberal democracy itself and the other forms of government from which it can be distinguished. Emerging as a regime type only in the 18th century, liberal democracy is a relatively recent development in the history of governments. While the regime is in many respects composed of ideas and materials that are hardly new or original, it nonetheless has a distinctive character produced by a novel "fusion" of liberal and democratic principles. Liberal democracy represents an alternative to older traditions of thinking about government as well as to other modern solutions to the problem of rule. Consideration of these alternatives brings the nature of liberal democracy into relief.

In the Politics, Aristotle articulates what became a classic typology of political regimes based on the number of rulers and the intention of the ruler or ruling class. Kingship, aristocracy, and polity represent, respectively, the rule of one, the few, and the many in the interest of the whole community, while tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy represent, respectively, the self-interested rule of one, the few, and the many. As each of these pure regime types excludes a certain portion of the population from rule, stable regimes will often involve a mixture of elements drawn from different regime types.

The staying power of Aristotle's categories and analysis proved remarkable: A millennium and a half later, Thomas Aquinas adopted Aristotle's classification scheme in an essentially unmodified form, and even Thomas Hobbes's rejection of Aristotle's categories several hundred years later bore witness to their continued influence in Western thought.

Modern thinkers such as Hobbes and John Locke echo Aristotle in maintaining that government may be by the one, the few, or the many. However, this similarity is superficial. For Hobbes and Locke, the differences among regimes are relatively minor and essentially represent variations of one regime rather than fundamentally different regime types. For Aristotle, differences among the primary regime types had been profound and consequential.

In Aristotle's view, differences among regime types reflect real differences among competing claims to rule. His regime typology allows that virtue, wisdom, wealth, and numbers (or more truly, poverty) might all claim to rule, and the regimes founded on these different bases will be quite different from one another. A regime dominated by the demos—or the many, who are always poor—both reflects and reinforces a way of life that bears little resemblance to the way of life of a society led by the virtuous few.

Their many differences notwithstanding, Hobbes and Locke both begin from the assumption that there is only one legitimate basis of political authority. Whatever the particular form of government, it must be authorized or consented to by a majority of the people, who are understood to be one another's equals. The reason for this is either that all men are in fact equal or that men presume themselves to be equal. As Hobbes puts it in Leviathan, "If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged; or if nature have made men unequal, yet because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted."

Hobbes and Locke imagine these presumably equal individuals to be living in a state of nature, or in a situation defined by the absence of political authority. Reflecting on the insecurity individuals would necessarily experience in such a situation, they argue that said individuals would found a regime oriented toward self-preservation. Although they come to different conclusions about what type of "commonwealth" might best secure individuals' preservation, the character of their respective regimes is nonetheless determined by a single source: the intentions and preoccupations of the residents of the state of nature.

While a Lockean or Hobbesian commonwealth might be administered by different numbers of people, the selection of a particular ruler or set of rulers is primarily a prudential judgment about who under the circumstances is best equipped to fulfill the modern regime's prescribed end. In a limited way, this choice might reflect the distribution of power and influence in a society, but different choices do not reflect legitimate disagreement about the ends of government or the ultimate source of political authority.

The heart of the difference between Aristotle on the one hand and Locke and Hobbes on the other lies in their divergent attitudes toward human equality. For Aristotle, inequalities stemming from excellences both natural and acquired were a legitimate basis on which some could claim to rule over others. However, Christianity proclaimed that men were fundamentally one another's equals, a notion that remained confined to the spiritual realm for a time but gradually began making claims on the mundane world. Hobbes's and Locke's arguments reflect the progress of the idea of equality in the West and the increasing difficulty men would have in instituting government on any other basis.

England and America: Montesquieu and the American Framers

With Montesquieu, one sees a return to consideration of a true variety of regimes. Montesquieu's classification of regimes considers primarily who rules and, in the case of a single ruler, whether that person rules with or without laws. Early in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu claims that there are essentially three ways in which political power can be distributed that correspond to three basic regime types: monarchical, despotic, and republican. A monarchy is the rule of one man in accordance with "fixed and established laws." Despotism is also the rule of one man, but "without law and without rule" and according to his own "will" and "caprices." All republics involve the rule of the people, but Montesquieu distinguishes between aristocratic republics, or rule by "part of the people," and democratic republics, in which all participate in rule.

Montesquieu goes beyond the general observation that regimes both reflect and shape character and explicitly associates a particular human passion with each regime type. Corresponding to the "nature" or structure of each regime is what Montesquieu calls its "principle," or the dominant human sentiment or passion that animates the regime and sustains the structure. Honor is the principle of monarchy, fear of despotism, and virtue of republican government, though the two varieties of republican government rely on two distinct species of virtue.

Later in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu presents an idealized version of the English constitution that does not fit neatly into his original classification scheme. The English regime is certainly a mixed regime, though Montesquieu hints that England is more of a republic than anything else. Nevertheless, it is a new kind of republic, one whose maintenance depends not on citizens' virtue but on institutional arrangements that will constrain citizens' passions.

In his discussion of England, Montesquieu describes a regime in which the powers of government are divided into three primary functions: legislative, executive, and judicial. The system features checks and balances designed to protect individual liberty by preventing any single part of the government from becoming permanently predominant. The regime is mixed in the traditional sense in that different social classes or estates are incorporated into the regime. However, while Aristotle's mixed regimes involved factious class struggles that cut across different governmental institutions, Montesquieu accommodates the different classes by assigning responsibility to each for a particular part of the government. Specifically, he recommends a bicameral legislature in which the nobles and people each have their own chamber. In this way, both parts of society are represented, and the competition between them for power and influence can be orderly and institutionalized while at the same time making it less likely that the classes will be able to oppress one another.

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution drew heavily on Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers but adapted it to a diverse, anti-monarchical society that lacked a hereditary nobility. Writing as Publius in The Federalist Papers, James Madison states that, unlike the English constitution, the proposed American Constitution would be fully compatible with republican principles because all parts of the government would be derived either "directly or indirectly" from the people. The Framers replaced England's monarchical executive with a president selected by a specially chosen electoral body and its hereditary upper chamber with an indirectly elected Senate. They established a judiciary that was independent of the other branches of government and crafted checks and balances they deemed necessary for maintaining the separation of powers within this particular institutional design. Last but not least, they devised a federal system in which power would be shared by the new national government and sub-national state governments, a recognition of the importance of the states within the Union that also created an additional set of obstacles to the concentration of power.

Liberal Democracy and Other Regimes Founded on Equality

In their regime, the Framers sought to combine liberty and popular rule, two principles that had rarely been found together in the theory or practice of government. Indeed, in attempting to combine liberty and popular rule in what we shall call a liberal democratic regime, they sought to marry two distinct traditions often considered incompatible with one another. First, the Framers pursued the liberal ends associated with "modern constitutionalism." Focused on protecting liberty and individual rights, modern constitutionalism emphasizes the importance of properly arranged institutions that limit governmental power and promote "deliberate decision-making processes." Such regimes can protect liberty without being particularly republican or democratic, but the Framers wanted government to be of, by, and for the people. Accordingly, they also drew on a democratic and republican tradition which infers a natural right to self-government from the presumption of natural equality. However, direct, unmediated rule by the people is incompatible with the liberty-minded procedures and institutions characteristic of modern constitutionalism. For this reason, the Framers established a system in which the people would be the ultimate source of political authority but in which their political participation would be facilitated by representation.

Not every regime founded on the idea of equality will be a liberal democracy in which equality and liberty are combined. In fact, given the art and science necessary to maintain a regime with a complex structure, Alexis de Tocqueville suggests that liberal democracy is in danger of being the exception rather than the rule. In Democracy in America, he attempts to anticipate the full political implications of Hobbes and Locke's insight that men henceforth would insist on being treated as equals. While liberal democracy is one possible outcome, other possibilities include two forms of "equality in servitude." The first is a "democratic despotism," or a centralized administrative state that supervises in minute detail the lives of apathetic, self-involved citizens whose taste for equality has become all-consuming and whom liberty and self-government strike as inconvenient and burdensome. The second possibility, even worse than the first, is a return to the unaccountable rule of one man or a small number of men, which shortsighted democratic citizens might welcome as a boon to their interests. Tocqueville's entire project may be viewed as an attempt to persuade his readers that striving to establish and maintain liberal democratic regimes—in some cases against difficult odds—is worth the effort it requires.

The words and deeds of the American Framers and Tocqueville presuppose that individuals can exert some degree of influence over their political destinies through the application of industry and intelligence, or through "reflection and choice." To be sure, good things can happen politically as a result of chance events and evolving circumstances, just as rational planning can lead to unfortunate political outcomes. Nevertheless, as the constellation of processes and institutions involved in establishing and preserving liberal democracies is necessarily complex and elaborate, it is advisable to study these various processes and institutions with some seriousness and attention. Such is the purpose of the next two units.

Supplemental Materials for Unit 1

A Note on Translations and Editions

There are many inexpensive and widely available translations of the works discussed in Unit 1. For student assignments, the following translations are recommended:

 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, eds. and trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); or Democracy in America, trans. George C. Lawrence (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006).

For the early modern texts originally published in English, the following Hackett editions are among the least expensive and most widely available:

• Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994).
• John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980).

Suggested Discussion Questions

 What is a "regime" or "constitution," and what is the purpose of studying the varieties of constitutions or regimes?
 Compare Aristotle's and Montesquieu's classifications of regimes.
 What does Tocqueville mean by the term "democratic revolution," and why is this revolution taking place? What are some of the consequences of the democratic revolution?
 What social and political advantages might a regime that is at least partly aristocratic offer?
 Does Montesquieu prefer the ancient republics (e.g., Athens and Sparta) or a modern regime such as England?
 According to Montesquieu, where did the English regime originate? Is this fact significant?
 Why does Publius argue for the extended republic?
 On what basis or bases is the idea of natural equality asserted and/or defended? Do you find any of these arguments persuasive?
 Describe the experience of living in what Tocqueville refers to as the democratic "social state." How does this experience differ from life in an aristocratic social condition?
 According to Ceaser, liberal democracy involves the "fusion of two governmental principles." What are these principles, and why are they difficult to combine?
 Why are liberal democratic regimes difficult to maintain? What role does political science have to play in the maintenance of liberal democracies?

Further Reading

 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Democracy: A Reader (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

A collection of essays that provides an excellent introduction to the topic of democracy, the challenges facing contemporary democracies, and questions of institutional design.

 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1984 [reprint 2007]).

A solid introduction to the thought of the American Framers and the argument of The Federalist Papers.

 Carnes Lord, "Aristotle" in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Joseph Cropsey and Leo Strauss, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

A good starting point for students interested in Aristotle's political science.

 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

A classic study of the "modern" nature of Hobbes's and Locke's political projects.

 Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy, trans. John Waggoner (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996); and Harvery C. Mansfield, Tocqueville: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Brief introductions to the central issues in Tocqueville's thought.

 Thomas L. Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

A close reading and careful analysis of Montesquieu's text.

 Jeremy Waldron. God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

James W. Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 8.

 

Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), III.7.
See, e.g., Aristotle, Politics, IV.8-9, V.8-9.
Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, trans. and ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 16; Aquinas, The Summa of Theology, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, 58-59.
Hobbes argues that regimes should be classified on the basis of number only, not on the basis of the aim of the ruler(s). Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), ch. XIX.1-2.
Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIX.1-2; John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980) ch. X.
Aristotle, Politics, III.13.
Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII.1-2; Locke, Second Treatise, §4-5.
Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XV.21.
Locke, Second Treatise, §6, 21; Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XVII.1-2, 13.
Locke, Second Treatise, §13; Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. XVII-XVIII.
See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George C. Lawrence (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006), esp. the author's introduction.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and eds. Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, and Harold Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 10.
Ibid.
Ibid., 21-29.
Ibid., bk. 11, ch. 6.
Ibid., 70.
Ibid., bk. 11, ch. 6.
Thomas Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 120, 122.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 159-161.
James Madison, Federalist 39, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter, introduction by Charles R. Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003).
Article I, Section 3, and Article II, Section 1, U.S. Constitution.
Article III, Sections 1-2, U.S. Constitution; Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 78.
Madison, Federalist 51.
Ceaser, 8-9.
Ibid., 6, 8-9.
Ibid., 8.
Ibid.
Madison, Federalist 10.
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 57
Ibid., 690-695.
Hamilton, Federalist 1; see also, e.g., Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II., pt. 4., ch. 8.
See, e.g., Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 167-168.