Texas Tech University faculty, staff, and students are likely to intersect with federal regulations imposing restriction on access, dissemination, or participation, when transferring items and information. 

Texas Tech is committed to complying with all U.S. export control laws and regulations having been implemented for reasons of national security, foreign policy, anti-terrorism, or non-proliferation. 

Violations of export control laws and regulations can result in significant civil and criminal penalties for Texas Tech and for individual researchers involved.

The Texas Tech Operating Policy for Export Control establishes policies for federal laws and regulations governing the export of information, products, and technology.

As a Texas Tech employee, if you are involved in any of the following situations, please contact:

Allie Matviko, by amatviko@ttu.edu or 806-834-3139 or

Claris C. Davis, by claris.c.davis@ttu.edu or 806-834-7249, before proceeding.

• You plan to travel or send items, information, or software to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, or other countries subject to sanctions or an embargo; or you are providing a "service of value" to an individual or organization located in one of these countries.
• You plan to export any tangible items or goods to another country, including any university-owned equipment that is being hand-carried on travel.
• You plan to disclose, ship, transmit, or transfer any technology or software that is not "publicly available."
• You plan to disclose, ship, transmit, or transfer any item, information or software that will be used to support military training of any foreign units or forces, regular or irregular.
• You plan to disclose, ship, transmit, or transfer any "defense article," or any item, information or software that has been designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military or intelligence applications.
• You plan to engage in activities that have the potential to relate to proliferation of nuclear explosive devices, chemical, or biological weapons, missile technology and/or the proliferation of chemical weapons.
• You are or plan to be involved in a transaction with a person or organization that is a "party of concern." See http://www.export.gov/ecr/eg_main_023148.asp

 

In the News

University Researcher Sentenced to Prison for Lying on Grant Applications to Develop Scientific Expertise for China

Foreign Intelligence Entities' Recruitment Plans Target Cleared Academia

2021: Princeton University

Princeton was charged with 37 unlicensed exports to research institutes in multiple countries.  Many of these countries are considered allies to the United States – proving that even one unlicensed export to a “friendly” country can result in a penalty.  To resolve the BIS allegations, Princeton agreed to pay a civil fine of $54,000 (double the value of the transaction involved).

Princeton University ran afoul of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for the unlicensed exports of strains and recombinant animal pathogens, which are export controlled for chemical and biological reasons, to multiple non-US universities that would have required require an export license.

2013: University of Massachusetts at Lowell

The university was charged with violating export control laws for exporting an atmospheric testing device and related equipment.  Specifically, the University was charged with violations of Sec. 764.2(a) of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) for exporting items classified as EAR99 to a party on the BIS Entity List.  This case reinforces the important point that even universities engaged in fundamental research are required to comply with export control laws.  It also reinforces the importance of prohibited party list screening as a mandatory part of export compliance efforts. 

The Center for Atmospheric Research exported an atmospheric testing device (valued at $191,870) and related cables and antennae (valued at $12,480) to the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission in Pakistan.  The exported items were classified as EAR99, the lowest level of export control under the EAR, and the University did not obtain the required export license. The University entered into a Settlement Agreement and agreed to pay a civil penalty.  

2006: University of Tennessee 

Professor John Reece Roth, electrical engineering, was convicted of export violations and sentenced to four years imprisonment for disclosing export-controlled technical data related to his research without obtaining an export license.  

Professor Roth allowed two foreign national students to access export-controlled data and equipment, and export some of the data from the contract on a trip to China.  Professor Roth was held personally liable for the violations, but the University of Tennessee was not prosecuted. 

Other University Violations

Geology faculty doing research in Armenia, taking University's magnetometer:

• On Commerce Control List.
• Restricted to Armenia.
• License required.
• Security measures (technology control plan).

Faculty summer travel to Sudan (embargoed) and South Sudan (not).  

• Funded with institution funds.
• Research topic raised concerns.
• Cannot take any laptop, etc. to Sudan, no license available.
• Cannot pay interview subjects (embargoes).