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The Fake Follower Problem: Influencers, Social Media Platforms, and Consumer Trust

INFORMATION SYSTEMS & QUANTITATIVE SCIENCES

Summary by Laura Bilbao, Director of Research & Outreach


In recent years, major social media platforms have faced growing criticism over bots, fake engagement, and manipulated popularity metrics.  This is not just bad behavior by dishonest influencers. Dr. Zihong Huang, Ph.D. and his colleague explored how influencers, consumers, and social media platforms interact in an environment where fake followers and engagement can be purchased. 

Surprisingly, the study finds that under certain conditions, stronger anti-fake efforts can actually encourage more fake account activity. How so?

The research identifies several market “equilibriums,” or stable situations, depending on how platforms enforce anti-fake policies and how consumers interpret influencer popularity: 

  • Pooling equilibrium scenario: Lower-quality influencers buy fake followers to imitate higher-quality influencers. Consumers cannot easily tell the difference.
  • Costly separating equilibrium scenario: As platforms increase anti-fake enforcement, even high-quality influencers may begin purchasing fake accounts to distinguish themselves or to maintain visibility.
  • Naturally separating equilibrium: If anti-fake technologies become sufficiently advanced, consumers can successfully distinguish between high- and low-quality influencers without the need for fake followers. In this outcome, fake account purchasing largely disappears.

Interestingly, increasing social media literacy, or the ability of consumers to critically evaluate online information, may actually intensify competitive pressure among influencers. This may lead some to purchase even more fake engagement.

The research also questions the incentives facing social media platforms.

A platform focused on profit may prefer weak anti-fake enforcement because inflated engagement numbers can make it appear more attractive to advertisers. Conversely, platforms that place greater importance on consumer welfare and trust are more likely to invest in anti-fake efforts. Still, the study suggests platforms may still prefer lower levels of enforcement than consumers themselves would want. 

The researchers identify one promising area of agreement: improving anti-fake technology appears to support the creation of a healthier digital marketplace without generating the unintended consequences that some enforcement strategies carry.

This research can help design more trustworthy digital marketplaces in today’s advertising world led by influencers. 

Zihong Huang, De Liu (2025) Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts. Management Science 71(10):8865-8883. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02616

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Zihong Huang

Zihong Huang

Assistant Professor                                         

Information Systems and Quantitative Sciences
Zihong Huang is an assistant professor in the Area of Information Systems and Quantitative Sciences (ISQS) at Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University. He holds a PhD from the Department of Information and Decision Sciences at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. Dr. Huang’s research focuses on the economics of social media and financial innovations. Currently, he is conducting research projects on creator economy on social media and data-driven venture capital. His work has been published in such journals as Management Science, Information Systems Research, and Financial Innovation. Dr. Huang has been teaching ISQS 3345: Analytics and Development with Python.